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Abstract
The statistical forecasting efficiency of new crop corn and soybean futures is the topic of
frequent academic inquiry.  However, few studies address the usefulness of these forecasts to
economic agents’ decision making.  Each year Central Illinois producers are faced with the
decision to plant either corn or soybeans on marginal acreage.  Agronomic concerns aside, these
decisions hinge on the expected relative return of corn versus soybeans, which is largely a
function of expected new crop prices.  Do new crop futures prices reliably guide producers into
the correct production decision?  The results suggest that over the entire period of the analysis,
futures markets provide only marginal decision-making information to the producer; however,
more recent signals do appear to be useful.  Further analysis explores several possible factors
that could explain why the signals have improved so significantly since 1985.
The Forecasting Value of New Crop Futures:
A Decision-Making Framework
Introduction
The Federal Agricultural Improvement and Reform Act of 1996 (FAIR), better known as
the "Freedom to Farm Act”, gives U.S. agricultural producers virtually complete control over
their production and planting decisions.  That is, producers no longer must maintain a "base"
acreage of a particular crop to remain eligible for government support programs.  Thus, they are
free to allocate their entire acreage (as opposed to just "flex" acres) as relative market prices
dictate (Willot, et al.).  The diminishing governmental influence on production decisions
magnifies the importance of market prices, and futures prices in particular, in guiding scarce
resources to their optimal use and heightens the research challenge posed by Hieronymus: “How
well do futures markets perform as devices for planning economic processes?” (1993, p. 18).  
There is considerable evidence that U.S. producers utilize futures prices as expected
output prices when making production and planting decisions (e.g., Gardner; Eales, et al.), and it
has been suggested that this is both a rational and desirable alternative to using USDA or
extension service forecasts (Brorsen and Irwin).  Stein demonstrates that if futures prices are
unbiased forecasts of realized prices, then the residual misallocation of production resources and
the subsequent social loss is unavoidable.  Many researchers have tested Stein's unbiased null
hypothesis by regressing the realized harvest time price against the planting time futures price
and testing that the intercept and slope coefficient are zero and one, respectively (e.g.,  Kenyon,
et al.).  The results of this method are mixed, and the procedure is generally fraught with
statistical troubles including concerns over data stationarity (see Zulauf, et al.) and statistical
power (see Kahl and Tomek).  Furthermore, unbiasedness does not guarantee that a forecast is
1The FBFM receives production data from a sample of Central Illinois pure grain producers (i.e.,
no grain fed to livestock) who farm over 260 acres of high fertility type soil.  The sample size varies from
a low of 101 farms in 1983 to a high of 674 in 1996 with an average sample size of 520.  The data set
includes fixed and variable production costs, crop acreage, and crop yields.  The presented work does not
utilize data from individual producers.  Rather, it focuses on the sample averages from 1972 to 1996 (25
observations).
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either efficient or particularly useful (Granger and Newbold).  Indeed, Tomek stresses that "the
best available forecast today can be a poor one" (p. 33).  Given this contention, it is worthwhile
to investigate whether new crop futures forecasts, biased or not, provide useful decision-making
information to row crop producers. 
The following research employs a new method and data set to evaluate corn and soybean
futures forecasts.  The objective is to determine if new crop futures provide economically
relevant information regarding producers’ investment of  acreage and resources into the
production of corn versus soybeans. 
Framework and Data 
During the spring planting season, Central Illinois producers can sow acres in either corn
or soybeans.  Agronomic concerns aside, producers' planting decisions are based on the relative
attractiveness of each investment.  A corn/soybean producer has roughly the same fixed
production cost on acreage regardless of whether corn or soybeans are planted.  Thus, the crop
with the greatest expected cash return (cash revenue less variable costs) is planted.  
Here, we use average production costs and crop yields for a sample of Central Illinois
corn and soybean producers from 1972 to 1996 (25 observations).  The data are provided by the
Farm Business and Farm Management Association (FBFM) at the University of Illinois,
Urbana-Champaign.1   Variable production costs are defined to include: fertilizer, pesticide,
seed, drying/handling, non-land interest, machinery repair, fuel, and hire.   Assuming that
2Alternative yield specifications were examined, including log-linear trends, quadratic trends, and
ARIMA specifications.  None of these alternative specifications altered the presented results.
3Cash and futures price data were provided by the Office for Futures and Options Research,
University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign.
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Central Illinois producers know these costs at planting time, then they will utilize them in
conjunction with expected cash revenue per acre to make planting decisions. 
A producers’ expected cash revenue per acre is a function of the expected output price
times the expected quantity of production per acre.  Here, the expected yield per acre is the ex
ante forecast from a simple linear trend regression model estimated from 1962 forward.  This is a
simplistic specification of expected yields; but, it is consistent with models utilized by
government and industry practitioners (Riley).2  
It is assumed that producers utilize new crop futures in forming expected output prices. 
That is, the expected harvest-time price equals the new crop futures price plus the expected
basis.  Here, the expected basis equals the average harvest-time basis for the prior three years. 
This basis expectation is consistent with industry practice and prior academic studies (see Garcia
and Sanders).
In this study, it is assumed that Central Illinois producers make planting decisions on the
last day of March, and harvest occurs at the end of October.  So, at planting (i.e., the end of
March), producers use new crop futures prices (December corn and November soybeans) plus
the harvest-time expected basis to determine their expected output price.  The actual output price
is the harvest-time (end of October) cash price represented by Central Illinois elevator bids to
producers.3
As an example of calculating the expected revenue and expected cash return, consider the
1995 crop.  At the end of March, December corn and November futures were trading at $2.62
4Clearly, an evaluation of this signal is a joint test of the yield, basis, and price forecasts.  Various
alternative basis and yield forecasts were utilized, but none of them altered the results.
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and $6.00 per bushel, respectively.  Over the prior three years, the average end of October basis
was -$0.20 per bushel for corn and -$0.21 per bushel for soybeans.  So, the expected corn and
soybean output prices were $2.42 and $5.79, respectively.  The ex ante expected trend yield for
Central Illinois producers was 158 bushels per acre for corn and 49.5 bushels per acre for
soybeans.  Thus, the expected revenue per acre for corn and soybeans were $382.36 and
$286.61, respectively.   Assuming producers know their production costs at planting time, then
the expected cash return is computed as the difference between expected cash revenue and
variable cash costs.  In 1995, the variable cost of production for corn was $189 per acre, and it
was $121 for soybeans.  Therefore, the expected cash return was $193.36 and $165.61 per acre
for corn and soybeans, respectively.   For the purposes of this paper, we define the difference
between expected corn and bean cash returns as the relative corn return.  In this example, the
expected relative corn return equals $27.75 per acre ($193.36-$165.61).  The relative corn return
is the variable of interest throughout the following study.  If the expected relative corn return is
greater (less) than zero, then the market is signaling producers to plant corn (soybeans).4  
The expected relative corn return implied by the futures market is compared to the
realized relative return at harvest time.  Continuing with the 1995 crop, the Central Illinois
harvest prices for corn and soybeans were $3.28 and $6.67, respectively.  The actual yields were
128 bushels per acre for corn and 44 bushels per acre for soybeans.  Thus, the actual cash returns
were $230.84 and $172.48, resulting in an actual or realized relative return to corn of $58.36. 
So, in this case, the signal provided by the futures market was correct, and producers benefited
by $58.36 for each acre planted in corn as opposed to soybeans.  Does the futures market
5Augmented Dickey-Fuller unit root tests for stationarity revealed that only the actual corn
returns failed to reject the presence of a unit root at the 10% level.  Using the Phillips-Peron test, all the
series rejected the presence of a unit root at the 5% level.  Hence, it is concluded the return series are
stationary. 
6Paired t-tests were also conducted for the difference between actual and realized returns for both
corn and beans.  For neither crop was there a statistically significant difference between the expected and
actual return.
5
consistently provide the correct planting signal and thereby meaningful information to the
decision-maker?
Method and Results
The following empirical work focuses on the expected and actual cash returns for the
average corn and soybean producer in Central Illinois.  In particular, the focus is on the market’s
forecast of relative corn returns and the information that this provides to producers.   First, the
characteristics and summary statistics of the data are examined.
Summary Statistics
The summary statistics for realized and expected corn and soybean cash returns are
presented in Table 1.  The average expected cash return for corn is $186.87 per acre and for
soybeans $177.79 per acre.5  A paired t-test fails to reject that these means are equivalent (10%
level), i.e., the mean expected relative return to corn is not statistically different from zero.  The
mean actual returns are slightly lower for both corn and soybeans at $173.79 and $164.52,
respectively.  Again, a two-tailed paired t-test for a difference in these means fails to reject that
they are equivalent; so, the mean actual relative corn return is not statistically different from
zero.6  Both the expected and actual returns are quite volatile year-to-year with roughly $216
separating the best and worst actual returns for corn and $112 for soybeans.  Oddly, the expected
6ACTUALt11EXPECTEDt1t (1)
returns for corn are not materially less volatile than the actual returns, and for soybeans the
expected returns are more variable than the actual returns.
Statistical Characteristics of the Forecast
The first test evaluates the new crop futures’ forecast in a traditional sense.  That is, the
futures forecast for excess corn returns is tested for unbiasedness.  Following a procedure similar
to Zulauf, et al., the actual relative returns are regressed on the market’s forecast.
Where, ACTUALt = actual harvest time relative corn returns in year t, and EXPECTEDt =
expected relative corn returns in year t.  So, the actual relative corn return is regressed against
the market’s forecast for relative returns.  The market’s forecast is unbiased if we cannot reject
the joint null hypothesis, H0: 1=0 and 1=1, using an F-test.
Estimation of equation (1), and use of misspecification tests indicated some degree of
parameter instability and a statistical reduction of the residual variance after 1985.  As a result,
equation (1) was re-estimated after dividing the data into two periods 1972-1985 and 1986-1996. 
The separation of the data reflects the periods before and after the introduction of the 1985 farm
legislation which marked the beginning of the decline of government intervention in agricultural
markets through a reduction in target prices, loan rates, and government stocks (1985 Farm Bill),
and later through the introduction of more flexible acreage policies (1990 Farm Bill).  The
regression results are presented in Table 2, and the underlying data are displayed graphically in
Figure 1.  The findings are clear, and the differences in the two periods are rather surprising.  For
7Equation (1) was also estimated in differences, where, the dependent variable was the year-to-
year change in ACTUAL, and the independent variable was the market’s expected change (EXPECTEDt -
ACTUALt-1).  With this specification the R-squared was greater, and we again could not reject that the
forecast was unbiased.
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the entire data set, the findings show that the forecasts are unbiased but rather poor estimates of
subsequent relative returns, suggesting that they provide relatively little information as to the
actual relative corn returns.7  Examination of the results by periods indicates that the overall poor
forecast performance is primarily due to the early set of observations.  During the first period,
although it is not possible to reject the null hypothesis of an unbiased forecaster, the R2 is
practically zero.  In contrast, during the second period, the variability in the actual relative
returns is rather highly associated with the variability in expected relative returns.
Information Content of the Forecast
Essentially, producers must decide among two alternative investments, corn and
soybeans, based primarily on output price forecasts provided by the futures market.  Henriksson
and Merton (H-M) develop a nonparametric test for evaluating if these type of forecasts provide
economically useful information regarding the relative performance of investments.  The H-M
procedure tests if producers should modify their probability beliefs, and thus production, based
on the new crop futures forecasts (Merton).  Notably, the test does not require any assumptions
about the distribution of returns nor the pricing of risk. 
The market signal is defined by the binary variable, SIGNAL = 1 if expected relative
corn returns > 0, and  = 0 otherwise.  This is compared to the realized harvest time returns
defined by the binary variable, FINAL = 1 if the actual relative corn returns > 0, and = 0
otherwise.   Presumably, if SIGNAL =1, then producers plant corn instead of beans, and if
FINAL =1, then this was the correct decision.  Conversely, if FINAL = 0, then this was not the
8The H-M test was also conducted with a Fisher’s exact test and a Logit model.  None of these
tests rejected the null hypothesis at conventional significance levels.
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correct decision.  The H-M test evaluates the statistical significance of this binary signal with
Fisher’s test for independence in a 2 by 2 contingency table (see Cumby and Modest) or
equivalently in the following regression (Breen, Glosten, and Jagannathan).
The null hypothesis that the market signal contains no economic or statistical information, 2=0,
is tested with a two-tailed t-test.  Rejecting the null hypothesis and finding that 2>0 suggests
that new crop futures provide economically meaningful information to producers concerning the
planting of corn versus soybeans.
Following a strategy similar to that used for equation (1), the data were split into two
periods, and three equations were estimated, one for the entire data period and one for each of
the subperiods.  The estimation results are presented in Table 3.  Again the results are rather
striking.  For the entire period, the estimated 2 is 0.233 which implies that 62% of the market
signals are correct where the percent correct equals (1+2)/2 (see Breen, et al.).  However, this
success rate is not statistically significant (p-value = 0.252).8  For the entire period, the null
hypothesis (2=0) cannot be rejected, suggesting that the forecast does not provide statistically
significant information to producers.  The results again suggest that the ability of the market to
correctly identify production and marketing opportunities improved dramatically.  During the
1972-1985 period, the market provided little information to producers.  During the 1986-1996
period,  2 was highly significant and 90% of the market signals were correct.
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The forecasting ability also is examined with the regression test proposed by Cumby and
Modest (C-M).  Unlike the H-M test, C-M test is not independent of the distribution of relative
returns.  That is, the C-M test is influenced if the market provides the correct planting signal in
years when it is especially rewarding to plant a particular crop.  The C-M test is conducted by
regressing the actual relative corn returns against the binary variable indicating the market’s
signal to produce corn or beans.  As in equation 1, define the variable ACTUAL = realized
relative corn returns, and define the variable SIGNAL as in equation (2), then the following
model is estimated.
The C-M test is basically a difference in means test.  If 3>0, then the mean actual relative corn
return conditioned on the market signal (3 +3) is greater than the unconditional relative return
(3 ).  The null hypothesis that the signal has no statistical ability to guide resources into the most
rewarding endeavor (3=0) is tested with a two-tail t-test.
The estimation results for equation (3) using the three different definitions of the data as
previously discussed are presented in Table 4.  For the entire data set, the mean unconditional
relative return to corn is -$3.62 per acre (3) , and the relative return when the market is
signaling to plant corn is $16.51 per acre (3 +3).  Although, the per acre relative return for corn
is greater when the market signals to plant corn versus beans, the difference is not statistically
significant (p-value = 0.353).  Thus, for the entire data set,  the null hypothesis is not rejected,
and again it is concluded that the expected relative return does not provide statistically
meaningful information in guiding resources into the production of corn versus soybeans. 
9Regressions not shown.
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Dividing the data set, and performing the same analysis again identifies the difficulty the market
had in forecasting realized relative returns during the first period, and its improvement during the
second period.  The first period is associated with an insignificant statistical relationship, and a
loss in relative returns per acre when the market is signaling to plant corn.  However, during the
second period, R2 increases dramatically, 3 is statistically significant, and the improvement in
relative returns when the market signals to plant corn is $19.20 per acre.
Discussion and Further Analysis
The improvement in the futures market’s ability to identify subsequent returns is likely
attributable to several factors.  First, the relative forecasting ability of the futures market
improved marginally during the second period.  While the ability of the corn futures market to
forecast harvest prices declined modestly in terms of R2  from 0.262 to 0.254, the ability of the
soybean futures market to forecast harvest prices increased in terms of R2 from 0.164 to 0.24. 
On a relative basis (i.e., the ratio of corn to soybean prices), the forecast ability of the markets
increased substantially with the R2 increasing from 0.01 to 0.275.9  It is interesting to note that
even with this relatively low level of forecast ability, futures signals identified correct acreage
decisions during the second period with a high degree of regularity.  Second, during the later
period there existed a higher degree of correspondence between the corn and soybean forecast
errors of local yield and local basis.  Correlation coefficients of the difference between expected
and realized corn and soybean yields for the first and second periods were 0.737 and 0.914. 
Similarly, correlation coefficients for the difference between expected and realized corn and
soybean local basis for the first and second periods are 0.606 and 0.787.  This higher
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correspondence suggests a more concomitant movement of realized returns, increasing the
likelihood that an effective relative signal would correspond to the actual situation.   Third,
national level corn and bean yields and their deviations from expectations were more highly
correlated during the second period.  The correlation coefficients between the change in corn and
bean national yields for the first and second period were 0.782 and 0.969.  The correlation
coefficients between the deviations from an expected yield for corn and soybeans defined in
terms of a combined forecast of last year’s yields and a ten-year moving trend forecast also
demonstrated a similar pattern, 0.807 and 0.963 for the first and second periods.  This higher
correspondence suggests a more consistent pattern of futures price changes.     
Finally, the relative effect of national inventories may have been more uniform during
the second period.  Previous research has documented the effect of inventories on the forecast
ability of futures markets (Tomek and Gray).  Not only do futures markets associated with
inventories demonstrate a closer correspondence between prices at planting and harvest because
of the supply of storage and arbitrage, but large inventories make price less susceptible to shocks
in supply and demand (Tomek).  Here, we suggest that the size of inventories and their co-
movement also may be affecting the market’s response to unexpected supply and demand
shocks.  During the second period, the level of stocks for both corn and soybean increased, and
their relative movement (particularly in terms of stock to end-use ratios) became more similar. 
Median level of stocks increased during the second period for corn and soybeans by 294 and 110
million bushels.   Median values of corn stock to end-use ratio decreased from 21 to 19.6% while
the median bean stock to end-use ratio increased from 12.1 to 13.6%.  Correlation coefficients
between corn and bean stock to end-use ratios for the two periods also demonstrated a more
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uniformly consistent pattern of relative stock movement during the second period, increasing
from 0.199 (not statistically significant at the 25% level) to 0.783.  In all likelihood, the higher
level of stocks and their more concomitant movement lead to the higher level of relative forecast
accuracy and may have resulted in smaller, more corresponding movements in prices to
unexpected shocks in supply and demand.
To examine the effect of stocks on unexpected corn and soybean price movements during
the two periods in more detail, regressions were specified to explain the percentage error
between planting and harvest futures prices for each commodity as a function of the percentage
error in estimated production and the percent stock to end-use ratio.  Estimated production was
specified as the product of USDA planting intentions in March and expected yields defined as a
composite forecast with equal weighting of a ten-year moving trend forecast and yields in the
previous year.  The USDA final output estimate was used as final production.  The equations
were estimated using a seemingly unrelated framework to account for the potential correlation in
the error terms of the two relationships (Table 5).  F-tests for structural change between the two
periods for both crops lead to a rejection of the null hypothesis of parameter constancy with p-
values for the F(3,38) distribution of 0.039 and 0.022 for the corn and bean equations,
respectively.  The results of the estimation suggest that larger than expected production reduces
the forecast error in futures prices.  In part, because of lower stock levels, the effect of
production errors are larger in soybeans than corn, and larger during the first period. 
Interestingly, the effect of production errors also appears more similar during the second period,
with elasticities of -0.615 for corn and -0.716 for soybeans.  The direct effect of the stock to end-
use variable also appears to change between the two time periods.  During the first period,
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increasing the stock to end-use ratios reduced the differences between planting and harvest
futures prices, with the effect being about twice as large in the soybean market.  During the
second period, the direct effect of the stock to end-use ratios was relatively small on the
difference between the prices in soybeans, and virtually nonexistent for corn.  Thus, we find
smaller, more uniform price forecast errors in response to errors in expected production when
stocks are larger and more similar in their movement.  
Summary and Implications
This research strives to evaluate the ability of new crop futures prices to guide resources
into the most profitable endeavor.  Producer planting flexibility provided by FAIR makes the
markets’ performance in this role increasingly important.  The research moves beyond traditional
tests of bias and seeks to more fully describe the decision-making value of new crop futures
forecasts to agricultural producers.
 The presented research examines the market’s ability to guide resources into the
production of corn versus soybeans for Central Illinois producers.  Focusing on relative corn
returns, returns to corn minus returns to soybeans, the research leads to the following
conclusions.  First, the futures market’s relative return forecast is confounded by considerable
uncertainty in price and yields.  Second, the futures market’s forecast of the relative corn returns,
in general, is an unbiased forecast.  Third, the futures market’s planting-time forecast of relative
corn returns provides little information to Central Illinois producers over the entire 1972-1996
period.  A producer following these signals would not have achieved statistically greater returns
per acre than a producer not following the signals.  Fourth, after 1985, following the
implementation of the 1985 farm legislation, the market signals improved.  That is, from 1986-
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1996, a producer responding to the futures market’s signals would have been correct 90% of the
time and would have benefitted with higher per acre returns. 
 The results indicate that in more recent years production signals have become more
accurate in terms of net returns.  The improvement in the use of the market was influenced by a
modest improvement in the forecast ability of futures markets.  Perhaps, more importantly,
during the second period, forecast errors in local yields, in local basis, and in futures prices of
corn and soybeans appear to be more uniform in their movement.  These factors suggest a more
concomitant movement in realized returns which undoubtedly increased the likelihood that the
relative signal would correspond to the actual returns.  Because of the importance of local yields
and basis fluctuations, the findings suggest that the ability of the futures market to provide
appropriate production signals needs to be examined for specific locations and production
characteristics.  This becomes increasingly important when one considers that soil quality, costs
per acre, and the degree of correlation between changes in local yields and prices also may differ
substantially across locales.  Further, the findings indicate that larger and more uniform
movements in relative stocks enhance the predictive ability of these markets.  As we move into
an era of reduced government participation in agriculture and reduced stocks, monitoring of the
relative level of stocks in order to assess the likelihood that expected returns are adequate
forecasts of realized returns will become increasingly important.  Finally, with the reduction of
loan rates in the 1985 legislation, government inventories have declined over time, especially
relative to total inventories, and the private sector has assumed a larger responsibility for
managing stocks.  It appears that in recent years private stock managers and the market in
general have performed reasonably well at providing planting signals to Central Illinois corn and
15
soybean producers.  In a future environment of possible increased yield and price uncertainty
and an enhanced flexibility of producers to allocate their resources under the FAIR program, it
will be interesting to see if the market continues its recent performance of providing adequate
planting signals to producers.            
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Table 1.  Summary Statistics for Expected and Actual Cash Returns
Corn Soybeans
Expected Actual Expected Actual
Mean* 186.87 173.79 177.79 164.52
Maximum 297.40 282.10 242.58 225.40
Minimum 75.80 66.54 86.13 113.30
Std. Deviation 51.26 54.42 37.94 30.13
*All numbers are in dollars per acre.  Cash returns are calculated as cash revenue per acre
less variable cash costs.
Table 2.  Test for Bias
    Coefficients 
Sample 1 1  R2 F-stat.
1972-1996 4.9025 0.4803 0.098 1.4635**
(0.478)* (1.581) (0.252)
1972-1985 21.0320 -0.1133 0.003 1.9513
(1.085) (-0.201) (0.185)
1986-1996 -0.0598 0.9376 0.714 0.0498
(-0.009) (4.736) (0.952)
*T-statistics in parenthesis.
**The F-statistic tests the joint null that 1=0 and 1=1.  The p-value is in parenthesis.
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Table 3.  Henriksson-Merton Test
Coefficients 
Sample 2 2 R2
1972-1996 0.5000 0.2333 0.057
(3.253)* (1.176)
1972-1985 0.8000 -0.2444 0.059
(3.564) (-0.873)
1986-1996 0.2000 0.8000 0.686
(1.500) (4.431)
*T-statistics in parenthesis.
Table 4.  The Cumby-Modest Test
Coefficients 
Sample 3 3 R2
1972-1996 -3.6233 20.1333 0.038
(-0.213)* (0.948)
1972-1985 27.0040 -12.5851 0.011
(0.996) (-0.372)
1986-1996 -41.9075 61.1061 0.665
(-3.556) (4.136)
*T-statistics in parenthesis.
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Table 5. Seemingly Unrelated Regressions of Percentage Error between Planting and
Harvest Futures Prices
1972-1996     1972-1985            1986-1996     
Corn
Constant -.058 (-1.26)* .029 (0.26) -.115 (-2.61)
% Production Error -.807 (-5.27) -1.018 (-4.13) -.615 (-4.50)
Stock to end-use -.210 (-1.39) -.651 (-1.94) .013 (0.10)
R2 .508       .566         .690       
Soybean
Constant    .015 (0.23) .132 (1.26) -.123 (-1.94)
% Production Error -1.055 (-5.40) -1.322 (-4.71) -.716 (-3.78)
Stock to end-use   -.215 (-0.48) -1.051 (-1.31) .542 (1.39)
R2     .528          .616       .611        
System R2    .642        .699        .743       
*T-statistics in parentheses.
Figure 1.  Actual vs. Expected Relative Corn Returns
1972-1996, Crop Years
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